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THE UNFINISHED WORK OF THE
INSTRUMENTALISTS
Willard Hurst*
By Robert Samuel Summers. Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell University Press.
1982. Pp. 295. $24.50.

!NSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY.

In Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, Professor Summers undertakes to define and criticize an influential body of
thought about legal order which he terms "pragmatic instrumentalism." Though he does not confine his study to four men, he centers
on the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Roscoe Pound, -John
Dewey, and Karl N. Llewellyn. None of these writers produced an
integrated theory of law broad enough to fulfill the potentials of the
themes they sounded. But Summers is persuasive that their work
tended to form a common pattern. His book - a contribution both
to jurisprudence and to the history of ideas - helps fill out the content of the pattern which these philosophers left only partly finished.
The author identifies the distinctive content of pragmatic instrumentalism in part through its contrasts with three other currents in
Western legal theory - analytical positivism, natural law, and historical jurisprudence. Analytical positivism has focused on the logical implications of concepts regarded as giving authoritative form to
a system of law, such as ideas of rights, duties, or sovereignty. Instrumentalism ,has focused more on tracing the use and efficacy of
law as a means toward achieving social goals. Natural law philosophy has measured positive law by criteria of justice, rightness or
goodness to be realized through legal processes. Instrumentalism
has tended to measure uses of law relative to wants in fact felt or
desires in fact held by popular majorities, or at least by politically
effective sectors of society. Historical jurisprudence - not a prime
element in this country's legal thought - has sought to identify values legitimated by usage and by the cumulative experience of a people. Instrumentalists have been more interested in employing and
understanding law in the here-and-now setting of a given time and
place. Summers seems right in rating instrumentalism - as marked
out by its contrasts to these other currents - as a fourth major
• Vilas Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Wisconsin. B.A. 1932, Williams College; LL.B. 1935, Harvard. Professor Hurst is the author of numerous books, most recently
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852

February 1984]

The Instrumentalists

853

strand in the history of Western legal thought. The assessment will
be convincing to most of those whose law studies were colored by the
legal realist movement of the late 1920's and early 1930's and who
have known law school curricula shaped largely by efforts to expose
law's functional relations to other social institutions or processes.
The men whose work Summers surveys set in motion many fresh
courses of ideas, research, and instruction, and stirred much controversy. In this light Summers' account is striking in its demonstration
of how relatively sketchy and incomplete was the sum of their product; this insight is the prime contribution of this book. Anyone who
has had much direct or indirect exposure to the influence of the instrumentalist approach will find that a good deal of what is set out
here is familiar. However, Summers' task requires that he provide
these familiar settings in order to bring into relief both the constructive and the limiting aspects of the instrumentalist tradition. I imagine that I am not alone in having found challenge in the kinds of
writing Summers deals with, and at the same time having wished
that they gave me more. These writers were most persuasive as critics; they were less satisfying in what they supplied to make good
what they displaced. By outlining the important gaps in their theory,
Summers provides suggestive indicators for work which might fill
out what the instrumentalists began. In one perspective his book is a
useful study in the history of twentieth century legal thought in this
country; in another, it is a contribution to research design.
At the heart of instrumentalist thinking has been its future-regarding insistence that people in this society seek to use law to
achieve practical social goals. This attitude has expressed itself and
has found encouragement in metaphors of social engineering. But
the instrumentalists did not match this ends-and-means orientation
with equal enthusiasm for exploring the legitimacy as well as the
sources of the social goals that lawmakers pursued. With some warrant Summers argues that instrumentalists tended to settle for goals
established mainly in quantitative terms: law should serve those
ends in fact desired by popular majorities, or at least by politically
effective interests. This approach avoids - or evades - setting
qualitative criteria for choosing goals to be served by law, and hence
also tends to promote rather narrow efficiency measures for validating means adopted to pursue goals. From this perspective there has
been unresolved tension between the natural law and the instrumentalist traditions. Pragmatic analysts shy off from the unacceptable
vagueness or rationalizations of undisclosed premises they find in
appeals to natural law. Yet a stubborn fact in this society's legal
tradition has been the persistence of the idea and the ideal of constitutionalism. A constitutional legal order asserts that all uses of
power in society should be subject to some effective criteria of values
beyond majority vote or the will of immediate holders of power.
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Summers does not choose quite these terms in observing that instrumentalist literature has scanted qualitative analysis. But tension
with constitutionalism fits his diagnosis, and suggests an important
limitation of the instrumentalist achievement.
Summers fairly notes that instrumentalist thinking emphasized
the roles of judges in making and carrying out public policy. Judgemade law bulked large in nineteenth-century development of legal
doctrine. Against that background it was understandable that
pragmatically-inclined philosophers centered on the work of courts
- chiefly on the work of appellate courts, but to some extent also on
what went on at the trial level. But to understand is not to justify the
extent of their concentration on the judicial process, particularly
when they wrote in the twentieth century context in which legislators
and executive and administrative officers were rapidly taking the
lead in lawmaking. There was passing reference to growth of statute
and administrative law, but this was not the prime subject of attention. Even Summers tends to emphasize courts. However, he does a
good job of outlining the range and diversity of goals which people
may seek to define and legitimize through legal processes, and the
material effects that choice of means may have on the content of
goals. Of like breadth is his catalog of contemporary techniques
which lawmakers employ to carry out their purposes - encouraging
private arrangement of affairs, providing civil remedies for grievances, distributing publicly supplied goods and services, creating
standards and rules to channel behavior under licenses or other regulatory devices, and prohibiting some conduct under penal sanctions. The range of his inventories explicitly and implicitly reckons
with a legal order in which legislative, executive, and administrative
processes loom large alongside judicial processes. The particulars of
his catalogs are not new; Roscoe Pound's zeal in classification led
him to elaborate analogous lists of interests fostered or protected by
law. 1 But Summers' analysis serves a distinctive function, casting
into sharp relief the relatively few categories upon which instrumentalist writings dwelt.
Summers finds a third limitation of the instrumentalists' contribution in their na'ive optimism about the capacity of scholars to find
facts to measure the effects of using law. Confident that they could
capture the realities of law in action, they were the more confident
that lawmakers could be effective social engineers. They underestimated the difficulties of measuring achievement not only of immediate goals of policy but also of intermediate or ultimate objectives.
They underestimated the difficulty of determining to what extent law
was a distinctive cause in situations where factors other than law
might be at play. They underestimated the difficulties of studying
I. E.g., Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1943).
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the effects of using law in the face of limits set by cost, by political
objections to controlled social experiments, and by lack of means to
measure intangible elements often critical in social experience. Beyond such limits lay issues which bring us back to the fact that much
instrumentalist literature tended to avoid dealing with qualitative
judgments. To try to measure law's efficiency is worthwhile. But the
fact that a use of law may efficiently produce a desired result does
not establish that the result is one that a just and humane society
should want. Again, Summers raises pertinent questions about the
limits as well as the strengths of the instrumentalist tradition.
Over the past thirty years scholars have given increasing attention to the successes of special interests in determining uses of law at
the expense of broadly shared but less effectively represented values.
This emphasis probably derives from the emergence of legislation
and executive and administrative rules and orders as the principal
types of lawmaking. Tensions between general and special interests
have figured also in the development of judge-made law, but the
growth of common law has relied on the focused energies of particular litigants to provide occasions of lawmaking - a setting which
tends to obscure the presence of group interests. Since instrumentalist thought concentrated on the work of courts, it is not surprising
that its exponents did not press far in examining challenges which
special interest pressures posed to the legitimacy of other types of
law. This is a limiting aspect of instrumentalism which Summers
does not explore in the degree that its importance would seem to
warrant.
Fifty years ago Karl Llewellyn delivered a devastating critique of
an over-generalized identification of a "school" of jurisprudential
analysis where in fact existed substantial diversity and differences of
views. 2 While reading so ambitiously broad a survey as that
presented by Summers, one must be somewhat uneasily conscious of
Llewellyn's warning. Specialists more qualified than I may find particular quarrels with Summers' identification of dominant trends and
themes among his pragmatic instrumentalists. But he does not fall
into the style of generalization for which Llewellyn criticized Pound;
to a reassuring degree Summers backs his generalizations with specifications. Overall, he is helpful in the range of elements he invites us
to consider in surveying this legal order. He persuasively documents
the presence of some important shared themes among writers who
have greatly influenced contemporary jurisprudence. It is a valuable
contribution to sensitize readers to the limits as well as the accomplishments of this important group.
2. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism R.Ev. 1222 (1931).
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